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The market for corporate control is one of the largest corporate markets. In 2007 alone, the
value of M&A transactions worldwide was a staggering $4.8 trillion. While some takeovers
proceed as negotiations of a target with a single acquirer, many takeovers face competition
among several bidders.1 The set of bidders is comprised of two groups: strategic and nancial.
Strategic bidders are usually companies in a related type of business, such as competitors, sup-
pliers, or customers. They tend to look for targets that oer long-term operational synergies
and integrate them into their own business. In contrast, nancial bidders, typically private
equity rms, look for undervalued targets with a potential to generate high cash ow, often
after a reorganization. After the acquisition, a nancial bidder treats the target as a part of
its nancial portfolio and sells it once exit opportunities become suciently appealing.
Despite their recognized importance,2 the dierences between strategic and nancial bid-
ders remain largely unexplored. A common view is that strategic bidders are systematically
willing to pay more than nancial bidders. For example, as Mark E. Thompson and Michael
J. O'Brien, practitioners in the private equity industry, summarize: \Strategic buyers have
traditionally had the advantage over private equity funds, particularly in auctions, because
strategic buyers could pay more because of synergies generated from the acquisition that would
not be enjoyed by a fund."3 Taken to the extreme, this view implies that strategic bidders
have systematically higher valuations of targets than nancial bidders: in the worst case, they
can implement the same changes as nancial bidders, but they can also be willing to pay more
due to synergies. Furthermore, the maximum willingness to pay of strategic bidders can be
even higher because of empire-building private benets of their managers. In this paper, we
evaluate this and other views about strategic versus nancial bidders by estimating valua-
tions of participating bidders in auctions of companies. We nd that an average participating
strategic bidder values a typical target more than an average nancial bidder. At the same
time, strategic and nancial bidders appear to be inherently very dierent. In particular: (1)
a signicant subset of targets is systematically valued more by nancial bidders, contrary to
the above view; (2) valuations of dierent nancial bidders are considerably less dispersed
than valuations of dierent strategic bidders; and (3) valuations of nancial bidders are more
correlated with aggregate economic conditions.
A major obstacle to the empirical analysis of bidders' valuations is the lack of data on all
bidders in takeover auctions. Unless bidding is public, which is rare, a researcher typically
observes only the outcome of the auction: the identity of the winning bidder and her payment
to the shareholders of the target. A naive approach to compare valuations of strategic and
nancial bidders would be to compare takeover premiums paid by strategic and nancial
acquirers for similar targets. This approach, however, is problematic for two reasons. First,
there is a selection bias: valuations of winning bidders are likely to be very dierent from
valuations of average bidders. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the takeover premium
is dierent from the bidder's valuation, which is her maximum willingness to pay for the
target. Because the winning bidder must outbid all other participating bidders, the takeover
premium depends not only on the valuation of the winning bidder, but also on the valuations
of other bidders.
To deal with the rst problem, we use data on all participating bidders in auctions of
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companies that took place between 2000 and 2008. We follow Boone and Mulherin (2007a,
2007b) and manually collect these data from deal backgrounds in the SEC lings, distin-
guishing between strategic and nancial bidders. Our data set includes information on all
participating bidders, dened as bidders who signed condentiality agreements, their informal
and formal bids, and in many cases their type, strategic or nancial. Our nal sample consists
of 349 takeover auctions and covers all takeover auctions of U.S. public companies in which
the acquirer paid in cash.
To deal with the second problem, we propose a methodology to estimate valuations of
strategic and nancial bidders from the data on their bids. The major challenge with such
estimation is that one has to impose reasonable assumptions about the mapping of unobserved
bidders' valuations into the observed auction outcomes. Unfortunately, existing models of
takeover auctions rely on rather restrictive assumptions, which are inconsistent with their
typical free-form nature. For example, the assumption that auctions of companies proceed
as \button" auctions with a continuously increasing price, as in Milgrom and Weber (1982),
is inconsistent with informal bids, jump bids, and re-entries, which occur in practice. While
these features can be explained by many dierent models, there is no consensus about which
model, if any, is the most reasonable.4 Thus, rather than commit to a particular model, we
build on Haile and Tamer (2003) and impose three assumptions that are consistent with a
large variety of bidding patterns in takeover auctions:
Assumption 1. Bidders do not bid more than they are willing to pay.
Assumption 2. Bidders do not allow opponents to win at a price they are willing to beat.
Assumption 3. Bidders do not make informal noncommitting bids, if their valuation is
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below the value of the target under its current management.
Haile and Tamer (2003) use Assumptions 1 and 2 to build lower and upper bounds on
the bidders' valuations. To obtain point estimates, we also impose parametric assumptions.
Specically, we assume that each bidder's valuation is a combination of the observable com-
ponent, which depends on the observed characteristics of the target, and the unobservable
private component. While the observable component is common for all bidders of the same
type, unobservable components dier across bidders and reect the heterogeneity within the
bidder's type. Assuming that valuations, conditional on bounds, have a truncated lognormal
distribution, we obtain point estimates of the sensitivities of average valuations of strategic
and nancial bidders to observable target and economy characteristics, as well as the variances
of unobservable components. Our empirical strategy allows for dierences between strategic
and nancial bidders but does not assume them.
Our ndings suggest that the view that strategic bidders are willing to pay more due to
potential synergies may be true for the average target. However, this view is far from captur-
ing the whole picture. The dierence in average valuations of strategic and nancial bidders
varies widely across targets. While strategic bidders have higher valuations for targets with
higher investment opportunities, as proxied by R&D expenditures and cash balances, nancial
bidders are willing to pay higher premiums for poorly performing targets, as reected in sub-
stantial negative cash ows. The average, across all targets, valuation of a strategic (nancial)
bidder is 16.7 % (11.7 %) above the stand-alone market value of the target. However, a large
subsample of targets, comprising 22.4% of our sample, is valued more by an average nancial
bidder than by an average strategic bidder.
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Our results are consistent with the alternative view of segmentation of the takeover market,
whereby dierent targets appeal to dierent bidders. According to this view, nancial bidders
have an advantage over strategic bidders in dealing with poorly performing mature targets. In
contrast, strategic bidders have an advantage in generating synergies out of targets' investment
opportunities. The advantage of nancial bidders can come from dierent sources, for example,
from having expertise in restructuring targets or from having access to debt at a lower cost
than strategic bidders. The latter argument is consistent with the ndings of Demiroglu and
James (2010) and Ivashina and Kovner (2011) that leveraged buyout rms' reputation and
bank relationships are related to the cost of debt of their portfolio companies. The positive
eect of investment opportunities on valuations of strategic bidders is also consistent with
strategic bidders' managers extracting private benets from investments. It is also consistent
with mergers being combinations of acquirers with low operating costs and targets with good
investment opportunities but high operating costs (e.g., Levine (2013)).
The dierence in the willingness to pay of strategic and nancial bidders appears to change
with aggregate economic conditions. Specically, higher valuations of nancial, but not strate-
gic, bidders are associated with a lower cost of debt, as measured by the aggregate credit
spread, and lower stock market performance over the 12 months preceding the transaction.
The former result relates to the recent ndings of Axelson et al. (2013) that nancial bidders
use more leverage to nance deals when debt is cheap.
In addition to dierences in average valuations of strategic and nancial bidders, we nd
a large dierence in the dispersion of their valuations. Variation in valuations of nancial
bidders is captured to a large extent by observable target and economy-wide characteris-
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tics. In contrast, valuations of strategic bidders are less tied to observables: the estimated
standard deviation of their unobserved valuation component is almost twice as high as that
of nancial bidders. This result is consistent with dierent nancial bidders applying sim-
ilar post-acquisition strategies and each strategic bidder having relatively unique synergies.
This nding suggests that dierent nancial bidders appear to be more interchangeable than
strategic bidders from the target's point of view.
Importantly, the above results cannot be obtained using a naive approach in which takeover
premiums are interpreted as valuations. Premiums paid by strategic and nancial acquirers
change similarly with target and economy characteristics. The only signicant dierence is
that the former pay more on average: 46.4% versus 36.5% of the premium to the market
value of the target. Moreover, the magnitude of unexplained variation is roughly identical for
both types of acquirers. These results are a consequence of endogenoneity of winning bidders
and takeover premiums: if strategic and nancial bidders compete against each other, the
takeover premium reects valuations of both bidder types no matter the winner's type. In
light of this, our paper makes a methodological contribution by providing a sensible way to
estimate bidders' valuations from all bids in takeover auctions. This approach is general and
can be applied to other questions that require knowledge of valuations in takeovers.
Our approach allows us to estimate and study acquirers' winning slack, that is, how much
acquirers underpay relative to their valuations. We nd that while nancial acquirers usually
pay close to their valuations, keeping on average 7:3% of their maximum willingness to pay,
strategic acquirers tend to have substantial winning slack, which averages 14:9% of their
maximum willingness to pay. Given that acquisitions by strategic bidders generate acquirers'
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abnormal returns that are close to zero on average (e.g., Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008)),
this result suggests either signicant stock market anticipation of acquisitions by strategic
bidders or large private benets of their managers, consistent with empirical evidence on
merger-induced CEO compensation (Grinstein and Hribar (2004), Harford and Li (2007)).5
Our work is related to several papers. Boone and Mulherin (2007b) analyze 400 takeovers
for large public U.S. companies and show that approximately half of them can be classied as
auctions given competition at the pre-public takeover stage. We follow their methodology to
identify auctions. Our sample is dierent because it covers a more recent period and a broader
range of companies. Betton and Eckbo (2000), Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2011), and Li
(2012) estimate sequential competition in takeovers based on public bids. Several recent papers
look at how announcement returns are associated with the type of the acquirer, but none of
them empirically studies competition and all bids within each auction, which is important for
recovering valuations. Bargeron at el. (2008) examine the dierence in announcement returns
for targets acquired by public and private acquirers (including private equity), and nd that
announcement returns are higher for targets acquired by public acquirers. Dittmar, Li, and
Nain (2012) nd that strategic acquirers that follow a rst bid by a nancial bidder have higher
returns than those that follow a rst bid by a strategic bidder. Hege et al. (2012) examine
returns to companies selling their assets to private equity and strategic buyers. Fidrmuc et
al. (2012) compare the selling process of rms acquired by nancial and strategic buyers.
Martos-Vila, Rhodes-Kropf, and Harford (2013) present a theory of oscillations in activity
between strategic and nancial acquirers based on debt misvaluation. Finally, our paper is
related to Axelson et al. (2013), who nd a substantial relation between economy-wide credit
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spreads and leverage in leveraged buyouts, and Demiroglu and James (2010) and Ivashina
and Kovner (2011), who suggest that PE funds' portfolio companies can have better access
to debt nancing.6 To our knowledge, our paper is the rst to study competition between
nancial and strategic bidders for the same targets and estimate their maximum willingness
to pay.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the process of a
typical auction of a company. Section II lays down the assumptions that link bids to bidders'
valuations, as well as the estimation procedure. Section III presents data and summary
statistics. Section IV reports the estimates and discusses the intuition behind them and the
impact of identication assumptions. Section V uses the estimates of the model to estimate the
distribution of takeover gains between targets and nancial and strategic acquirers. Section
VI discusses approach validity and reports various robustness checks. Section VII concludes.
I. Institutional Background
Insert Figure 1 About Here.
Before setting up the model and estimation procedure, we describe how auctions of com-
panies are usually conducted. The process of a typical takeover auction, shown in Figure 1, is
described and studied by Hansen (2001) and Boone and Mulherin (2007b). It usually starts
when the rm (typically, its board of directors) decides to sell itself to a potential buyer. At
or before this stage, the rm hires an investment bank, which examines potential strategic
and nancial buyers and presents a list of potentially interested parties to the rm. The
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rm and its investment bank contact the parties who, in their view, might be interested in
acquiring the company. The interested potential bidders sign condentiality agreements upon
which they may receive access to nonpublic information about the target. After studying
this information, some of the bidders submit preliminary bids in several rounds. The bids
at this stage are nonbinding (or informal) in the sense that bidders do not commit to them
and frequently renegotiate them in the future. Between rounds of bidding, qualied bidders
are provided with additional information through presentations by senior management, plant
and site visits, and review of documents assembled in a \data room." After several rounds of
preliminary bids, the selling rm and its investment bank ask a smaller number of the most
interested bidders to submit nal-round bids. Upon receiving the nal-round bids, the rm
sometimes negotiates with the bidders and raises the price. The nal-round bids are usually
binding, and the takeover agreement is usually signed soon after receiving the nal-round bids
(in many cases, within two to three days). Sometimes, the target accepts a formal oer from a
bidder even beyond the nal-round deadline if it is suciently high. Before the rst takeover
agreement is signed, the takeover process is private in the sense that bidders and their bids
are not publicly announced. In the rest of the paper, we refer to the preliminary nonbinding
bids as informal bids and to the nal-round bids and public bids after the takeover agreement
is signed as formal bids, unless it is stated explicitly that the nal-round bid is subject to
additional due diligence or approval of nancing.
No standard model captures all features of a typical takeover auction. On the one hand,
because of multiple rounds of bidding and post-bid negotiations, a takeover auction is similar
to an English (ascending-bid) auction, in which the bidders oer higher prices until only one
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of them remains, winning the asset and paying according to her oer. On the other hand,
takeover auctions dier from English auctions in several respects. First, there are usually
several rounds of informal bids. The exact number of rounds is not predetermined, and
bidders do not commit to their informal bids, often decreasing them in subsequent rounds.
Second, while bidders are often informed if their current bid is the highest, they usually do
not know the exact bids of their competitors. Third, bidders sometimes exit and later reenter
the sale process. Fourth, jump bids and negotiations between the selling rm and bidders are
common. Finally, while the auction process describe above is typical, deviations are frequent.
Given these peculiarities, it is dicult to come up with a formal model that is close to the
true process of takeover auctions. We address this issue in our empirical strategy.
II. Model Specication
We now turn to assumptions about bidding in a takeover auction. Given the free-form
structure of a typical takeover auction, our goal is to avoid signicant abstractions and at the
same time provide sucient structure to estimate bidders' valuations.
A. Strategic and Financial Bidders
Consider an auction for target i. Suppose that the auction has Ni participating bidders.
Participating bidders are dened as bidders that agree to sign condentiality agreements and
thereby may obtain access to nonpublic information about the target. Each bidder belongs to
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one of two categories, strategic and nancial, denoted by s and f , respectively. Let ti;j 2 fs; fg
denote the type of bidder j in the auction for target i.
After observing nonpublic information about the target, each bidder learns her valuation,
which is the maximum amount that the bidder is willing to pay to acquire the target.7 We
assume that the valuation of bidder j is given by
Vi;j = Mi exp

X 0iti;j + ti;j"i;j
	
. (1)
Here,Mi refers to the value of the target under its current management, and exp

X 0iti;j + ti;j"i;j
	
refers to the bidder-specic premium (or discount, if it is below one). The premium of each
bidder is the sum of a public common component, X 0iti;j , which is the same for all bidders of
the same type (nancial or strategic), and a private component, ti;j"i;j, which is specic to
each bidder. The public common component captures common factors that aect the attrac-
tiveness of the target to all bidders of the same type. This component depends on the vector
Xi of publicly observable characteristics of the target and aggregate economic conditions at
the time of the auction. The common factors can be dierent between the two classes of bid-
ders: s can be dierent from f . The private component captures such factors as synergy and
suitability of the target for each potential acquirer. We assume that all "i;j are independently
distributed according to the standard Normal distribution. Section VI presents robustness
checks and discussions of this and other assumptions.
This model embeds, as a particular case, the view that strategic bidders can implement
the same changes as nancial bidders but can also generate synergies. In case this view
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is true, X 0if captures the value that a nancial bidder generates by implementing changes
in the target, f is small relative to X
0
if because all nancial bidders implement similar
changes, X 0i (s   f ) corresponds to average synergies that a strategic bidder generates, and
"i;j measures the degree to which synergies vary across strategic bidders. Under this view,
X 0i (s   f ) is positive for all targets, perhaps with rare exceptions. In general, however,
X 0i (s   f ) can take either sign, because either group of bidders can have an advantage in
bidding for a particular target. In addition, f can be high, because nancial bidders can also
dier in their expertise, envisioned changes in the target, and access to debt nancing.
For notational simplicity, we normalize bidders' valuations by the value of the target under
the current management:
log vi;j  log

Vi;j
Mi

= X 0iti;j + ti;j"i;j: (2)
Two points are worth noting about our specication. First, we avoid making assumptions
about the exact sources of valuations. Specically, willingness to pay can come not only from
synergies but also from private benets, and we do not assume away one or the other. Second,
the form of valuations (1) implies that there are three potential sources of dierences between
nancial and strategic bidders. Strategic and nancial bidders can dier because they value
dierent targets, because their valuations respond dierently to changes in aggregate economic
conditions, or because the importance of the private component of valuations is dierent across
types. The rst two eects are captured by the potential dierences between s and f . The
third eect is captured by the potential dierence between s and f . While the model allows
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for dierences between strategic and nancial bidders, it does not impose them.
B. Bidding Behavior
Instead of committing to interpretation of bids implied by any particular model, we rely
on the following assumptions, previewed in the introduction:
ASSUMPTION 1: Bidders do not make formal bids exceeding their willingness to pay.
ASSUMPTION 2: Bidders do not allow an opponent to win at a price they are willing to beat.
ASSUMPTION 3: Bidders do not make informal noncommitting bids if their valuation is
below the value of the target under its current management.
Assumptions 1 and 2 come from Haile and Tamer (2003), who deal with nonparametric
estimation of bidders' valuations in English auctions without clearly identiable rules. Their
motivation is straightforward. Because, independent of the underlying structure of the auction,
every formal bid is potentially a winning bid, it is irrational for a bidder to bid above her
valuation. This motivates Assumption 1. Assumption 2 means that as long as there is a
chance of winning the auction and paying below the valuation, a rational bidder will take this
opportunity.8 In takeover auctions, targets often inform bidders whose current bids are high
but below the highest bid that there is a better oer. Thus, bidders have the opportunity to
respond to the current highest bid.9 Given this, Assumption 2 means that a bidder does not
miss this opportunity, if she can make a positive surplus. Finally, Assumption 3 is natural in
the context of takeover auctions. If a rational bidder learns that she values the target below
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its value under the current management, she will not continue to invest time and resources to
submit formal or informal bids, as the target's shareholders will not agree to sell the company
at a price attractive to the bidder.
These restrictions on bidding strategies allow for a large variety of bidding patterns ob-
served in auctions of companies. For example, these restrictions are compatible with jump
bidding, bidders reentering the takeover process, and bidders not bidding at all. In addition,
the implied ranking of bids does not necessarily map one-to-one with the ranking of bidders'
valuations, except for the winning bidder, who must be the bidder with the highest valuation.
C. Estimation Strategy
Consider an auction for target i. Let bi;j denote the formal bid submitted by bidder j
during the process of auction i and let ti;j denote the bidder's type (s or f).
10 If bidder j
submits only an informal bid, then Assumption 3 implies that her informal bid is equivalent
to a formal bid of Mi. Hence, we can set bi;j = Mi. Similarly, if the bidder does not submit
any bid, then this is equivalent to having a formal bid of zero. Hence, we can set bi;j = 0.
Without loss of generality, we sort bidders within each auction in descending order by
their highest bid: bi;1  bi;2  :::  bi;Ni . The rst bidder is thus the winner. We need to
write the likelihood of auction i's outcome given the realization of bids bi = (bi;1; bi;2; :::; bi;Ni)
0,
types ti = (ti;1; ti;2; :::; ti;Ni)
0, and model parameters  = (S; F ; 2S; 
2
F )
0. Assumptions 1{3
put bounds on the valuations of each bidder. Because we do not take a further stand on
the underlying bidding model and valuations, by observing bids we (as researchers) update
bounds on valuations but not other properties of the distribution. Several events constitute
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this likelihood. By way of example, we only provide the expression for the likelihood of one
of the events (the rest are provided in Section A of Appendix B):
1. Bidder 1 submits formal bid bi;1 and wins. By Assumption 1, the likelihood of this event
is
li;1(vi;1jXi; bi;1; ti;1; ) = Pfbi;1  vi;1jXi; ti;1; g = 1  
 
log
bi;1
Mi
 Xiti;1
ti;1
!
; (3)
where () is the c.d.f. of the standard Normal distribution.
2. Bidder j > 1 submits formal bid bi;j and loses to bidder 1.
3. Bidder j > 1 submits informal bid of any size and loses to bidder 1.
4. Bidder j > 1 does not submit any bid.11
Because the identity of the winning bidder is public information, we always know whether
bidder 1 is strategic or nancial. However, information on a losing bidder's type is not always
provided in deal backgrounds and thus is not always known to the researcher. To deal with
non-observability of some of losing bidders' types, we use a two-step estimation procedure,
the details of which are outlined in Sections B and C of Appendix B. In the rst step, we
estimate the probability P fti;jjZig that a losing bidder's unobservable type is ti;j 2 fs; fg using
observable data Zi, which contains target and economy characteristics Xi and outcomes of the
auction (winning bid, winning bidder's type, and total number of bidders). The important
assumption here is that, conditional on the characteristics of the target and auction outcomes,
the distribution of losing bidders' types is unrelated to whether these types are reported in deal
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backgrounds. In the second step, the expected likelihood E [li;j(vi;jjXi; bi;j; ti;j; )] of the event
is calculated as the weighted sum of the likelihoods conditional on type ti;j, with probability
weights of each ti;j given by the rst-step estimate.
By independence, the likelihood function for auction i can be written as
Li(vijNs;i; Nf;i; Nu;i; Xi; bi; ti; ) =
NiY
j=1
E [li;j(vi;jjXi; bi;j; ti;j; ) j ti;j] ; (4)
where Ns;i, Nf;i, and Nu;i are the number of strategic bidders, nancial bidders, and bidders
with unobservable type, respectively, such that Ns;i +Nf;i +Nu;i = Ni.
Let Li(vijNs;i; Nf;i; Nu;i; Xi; bi; ti; ) = logLi(vijNs;i; Nf;i; Nu;i; Xi; bi; ti; ). Dene b = (b1; b2; :::; bI)0
and t = (t1; t2; :::; tI)
0, where I is the number of auctions in our sample. Also, dene Ns, Nf ,
and Nu to be the sum of the corresponding number of bidder types across all auctions. The
complete likelihood function of the model is given by
L(vjNs; Nf ; Nu; X; b; t; ) = 1PI
i=1Ni
IX
i=1
Li(vijNs;i; Nf;i; Nu;i; Xi; bi; ti; )
=
1PI
i=1Ni
IX
i=1
NiX
j=1
E [log li;j(vi;jjXi; bi;j; ti;j; )jti;j] : (5)
The estimates are obtained by maximizing (5) over the set of parameters . Additional details
on the analytical properties and numerical implementation of the above maximum likelihood
method are given in Appendix B. In Section B of Appendix C, we use simulations to examine
the performance of the estimator, we compare it to a number of alternatives, and we argue
that it performs well at recovering valuation parameters.
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III. Data and Summary Statistics
A. Data Description
We analyze a sample of corporate takeovers announced and completed in the period from
January 1, 200012 to September 6, 2008 (the most recent data entry at the moment of data
collection). The sample comes from the mergers and acquisitions database of the Securities
Data Corporation (SDC). We require that targets and bidders satisfy the following set of
conditions:
 The target is a publicly traded nonnancial (SIC codes 6000{6999 excluded) U.S. com-
pany;
 Bidders seek 100% of target shares;
 Winning bids are made in cash only;
 The deal is not a spin-o, recap, self-tender, exchange oer, repurchase, minority stake
purchase, acquisition of remaining interest, or privatization;
 The deal is an auction. We dene the deal as a negotiation if only one potential bidder
signs a condentiality agreement and as an auction if two or more potential bidders sign
condentiality agreements;
 Final deal value (value of the winning bid) is included in the database;
 Deal backgrounds are available in SDC.
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Whenever the nal two requirements are not satised, we try to complement the data
using other sources (EDGAR lings on the SEC, MergerMetrics).
We impose two important constraints on the deal to include it in our sample. First, we
focus on cash-only deals because in this case the value of the deal is known with certainty. Our
estimation strategy requires knowledge of the value of the winning bid to bound valuations of
all bidders. If the winning bid is in securities, its equivalent cash value depends on unobservable
characteristics of the bidder and thus cannot be reliably compared to cash-only deals or to
other bids in securities without imposing a realistic model of security pricing and observing
identities and characteristics of all auction participants. We discuss the diculties with using
data on noncash bids in more detail in the Internet Appendix and the potential selection
eect in Section VI.13 Second, we focus on takeovers in the form of auctions for two reasons.
First, if a takeover is a negotiation with a single bidder, its outcome depends on expected
competition should the bidder's oer be rejected. Because this expected competition is not
observed, including negotiations in the sample is not feasible. Second, the quality of some
deal backgrounds classied as negotiations is low: these deal backgrounds are signicantly
shorter and include less information on the takeover process. As a result, some deals classied
as negotiations can actually be auctions with missing information on losing bidders. These
two factors prevent us from including negotiations in the sample.
The background documents allow us to manually collect information on participating bid-
ders in each auction. We dene participating bidders as bidders who sign a condentiality
agreement with the target, thereby obtaining access to condential data. For each takeover
i, we collect the total number of bidders Ni, the number of bidders known to be nancial
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bidders Nf;i, and the number of bidders known to be strategic bidders Ns;i, as dened in the
deal background. The types of Ni  Ns;i  Nf;i bidders are unknown.
After signing a condentiality agreement, a bidder can drop out of the auction, submit
only a nonbinding oer (an informal bid), or submit a binding oer in the nal round of the
auction (a formal bid). Sometimes bidders submit competitive bids publicly after the takeover
announcement; we also treat these bids as formal bids. If a bidder submits multiple bids, we
use the highest formal bid submitted in the course of the auction, which is also typically the
last bid of the bidder.
Appendix A provides an example of a takeover auction. In particular, it contains extracts
from the SEC deal background that we use to collect the data. Manor Care, a target in the
healthcare industry, decided at the meeting of the board of directors on April 10, 2007 to
explore strategic opportunities to enhance shareholder value, possibly through selling itself.
Over the course of the next several weeks, JP Morgan, the investment bank of Manor Care,
contacted 48 potential bidders, 23 of which (two strategic and 21 nancial) signed conden-
tiality agreements and thereby received access to nonpublic information about the company.
Two strategic and eight nancial bidders made informal oers during several rounds of infor-
mal bidding, and two bidders, one strategic and one nancial, made formal oers at the end
of the process. The eventual acquirer, Carlyle, a nancial bidder, made an oer of $67 per
share and won the auction. The other bidder that submitted a formal bid oered $65 and lost
the auction. On July 2, 2007, Manor Care and Carlyle issued a joint press release announcing
the deal. The data we collect from this auction consist of the number of bidders that signed
condentiality agreements, the type of each bidder, a binary indicator for whether each bidder
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submitted a bid (formal or informal), and the bidder's formal bid, if any.
Following other empirical research on mergers and acquisitions, we collect data on the
market values of the targets14 (i) four weeks prior to the date of the takeover announcement
and (ii) one day prior to the date of any press release that states that the company is for sale
or is exploring strategic alternatives (only if the press release occurred no less than four weeks
and no more than one year before the takeover announcement).15 Whenever there is a press
release, we use (ii) as a measure of Mi in the model; otherwise, we use (i) as a measure of
Mi:
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Characteristics of the targets come from the quarterly COMPUSTAT database. We collect
and construct the following target characteristics: rm size dened as the book value of the
target's total assets, market leverage, average q-ratio (market-to-book), cash ow over the
last four quarters, cash and short-term investments, R&D expenses, and intangible assets
(all measured as ratios to the target's book value). Economy-wide variables are the market
return, dened as the cumulative return on the S&P 500 index over the 12 months prior to
the announcement date, and the credit spread, dened as the rate on Moody's Baa bonds
preceding the date on which the snapshot of the market value was taken minus the rate on
10-year Treasury bonds on the same date.
We use standard assumptions in the literature to lter out unreasonable values of exogenous
variables that are likely to be mistakes. Specically, we remove observations with market
leverage below zero and above 100%, q-ratio in excess of 10, cash ow in excess of 10, and
negative cash. In addition, we remove eight instances in which the ratio of the winning bid to
the target's value under the current management is below one, and two instances in which it
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is above four. The latter cases are clearly outliers; the former cases (all except one auction)
correspond to takeovers in which the auction process did not proceed \by the book," most
often because time constraints prohibited the target from soliciting the highest oer (either
the target was in deep distress or its blockholder inuenced the immediate sale of the company
at a low price). After applying the above lters, we are left with 349 takeover auction and
4,365 bidder observations.
B. Summary Statistics
Insert Table I About Here.
Table I shows bidder participation for the full sample of auctions and the auctions won
by strategic versus nancial bidders, as well as across 11 industries dened as in Fama and
French (1997).17 On average, an auction won by a nancial bidder attracts approximately
six more participants. The bidder's type is known for approximately 45% of bidder observa-
tions. On average, nancial bidders participate in auctions more often but win less often (in
approximately 40% of the cases). An auction won by a strategic bidder has more observed
strategic bidders, while an auction won by a nancial bidder has more observed nancial
bidders. The winning bid paid when a strategic bidder wins the auction is on average 9:9
percentage points higher than the winning bid paid when a nancial bidder wins the auction:
46:4% versus 36:5%. This result is consistent with Bargeron et al. (2008), who show that
targets' announcement returns are higher for targets acquired by public rather than private
(in particular, private equity) acquirers.
Approximately 40% of auctions in the sample are for targets that belong to the \Business
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Equipment" industry, which includes business and computer services and software companies.
The two other industries with the highest number of takeover auctions are \Wholesale, Retail"
and \Healthcare, Medical, etc.," with each accounting for 13% to 14% of the sample. Auctions
in the \Chemicals," \Business Equipment," and \Healthcare, Medical, etc." industries have
on average a smaller number of bidders. On the other hand, for the latter two industries,
the composition of competitors is skewed towards strategic bidders and the winning bid is
relatively high, which suggests that these targets are especially valued by strategic bidders.
Insert Table II About Here.
Table II complements Table I by presenting descriptive statistics of target characteris-
tics. The average target's size is $654 million; the total sample accounts for $228 billion
worth of transactions. On average, nancial bidders tend to win in auctions for slightly
larger companies (average size is $1,168 million) with higher recent cash ows that also have
higher leverage ratios. Strategic bidders end up acquiring targets with higher q-ratios, greater
R&D expenditures, and more cash and short-term investments. The magnitudes of two target
characteristics, leverage and cash and short-term investments, markedly dier from the COM-
PUSTAT averages. This is not surprising given the composition of our sample: 53% of the
sample are rms from the \Business Equipment" and \Healthcare, Medical, etc." industries.
Table II shows that these are growth rms that, consistent with prior research, are more likely
to have low leverage and large cash balances.
Insert Table III About Here.
Table III presents descriptive statistics for bids made by strategic and nancial bidders,
as well as by bidders whose type we do not observe. An average auction has between 12
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and 13 bidders who sign condentiality agreements. These numbers are higher than those
in Boone and Mulherin (2007a, 2007b), likely because their sample includes only auctions
for large targets, which are on average less competitive, while we consider auctions for all
public companies. Approximately one-third of bidders make informal bids, and an average
auction contains approximately four informal and 1.36 formal bids. Strategic bidders are more
likely to submit both informal and formal bids. Consistent with Table I, the average of all
(including losing) formal bids is higher for strategic bidders. In our sample 33 formal bids
are impossible to classify by bidder type. These bids appear to be higher than the average of
formal bids made by both strategic and nancial bidders. However, due to a small number of
these unclassied bids, these statistics are not meaningful.
IV. Estimation Results
A. Recovering Bidder Types for Bidders with Missing Information
In the rst step, we recover the probability that a bidder whose type we do not observe is
strategic to use this information as an input when estimating valuations. For this purpose, as
we describe in Section II.C, we estimate the equation
P (ti;j = sjZi) =   (Z 0i) ; j > 1: (6)
Equation (6) determines the probability with which a losing bidder j in an auction for target i is
strategic as a function of the observable characteristics of the target, the economic environment
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at the moment of the takeover, and the properties of the auction (number of bidders, type of
winning bidder, and winning bid). Because the type of the winning bidder is always known, we
estimate equation (6) only on the sample of losing bidders to avoid selection bias. Assuming
that in auctions for similar targets with similar outcomes losing bidders whose type is unknown
are not dierent from losing bidders whose type is known,   (Z 0i^) is the estimated probability
that a losing bidder of an unknown type is strategic, where ^ is the vector of estimates.
Insert Table IV About Here.
Table IV reports the results of the binary Logit model, which we use to estimate equation
(6).18 Table IV shows that most observable characteristics are signicant in predicting the
probability that an unobserved bidder is strategic. For example, a bidder with unobserved
type is more likely to be strategic if the auction has a lower number of participating bidders
and the winner is a strategic bidder.
B. Valuations of Strategic and Financial Bidders
Insert Table V About Here.
Having recovered the probabilities that bidders with unobserved type are strategic or -
nancial, we can estimate the parameters of the valuation model{s, f , s, f{using maximum
likelihood. Before doing so, it is instructive to see what results can be obtained using a naive
approach that regresses the takeover premium on characteristics of the target and the econ-
omy separately for the targets acquired by strategic and nancial bidders. The right panel of
Table V presents the results. As we can see, the target and economy-wide characteristics do
not appear to have dierential eects on the premiums paid by strategic and nancial bidders.
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Many coecients are not statistically signicant, and the statistically signicant coecients
do not appear to be dierent for strategic and nancial bidders. Similarly, the magnitude of
unobserved variation in the takeover premium is almost identical for strategic and nancial
bidders. At the same time, strategic acquirers pay on average 9.9% more of the market value
of the target than nancial acquirers, as shown in Table I. Taken together, these results may
lead one to believe that strategic bidders are indeed systematically willing to pay more than
nancial bidders for any target, likely due to potential synergies and agency conicts.
Results of our valuation model are very dierent. The estimates are reported in Table V.
Model I illustrates the most basic comparison of the valuations of the two groups of bidders,
unconditional on target and economy characteristics. Model II presents our main specication.
To see whether the sensitivity of bidders' valuations to observable characteristics of targets is
driven by industry eects, Model III expands Model II to include industry dummies following
the ve-industry classication of Fama-French (1997).19
Consistent with higher takeover premiums, we nd that strategic bidders have higher av-
erage valuations in the sample. According to Model II, the average valuation of a strategic
(nancial) bidder of an average target in the sample is 16.7% (11.7%) above its value under
the current management. However, this dierence varies across targets and economy-wide
characteristics. The estimates of Models II and III suggest that valuations of strategic and
nancial bidders have dierent patterns. Valuations of strategic bidders are positively associ-
ated with R&D expenditures, cash balances, and moderate leverage of the target. In contrast,
valuations of nancial bidders are negatively associated with cash ows and intangibles of the
target. Valuations of strategic bidders are also negatively associated with size, but this is
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likely due to our focus on auctions in which the winning bid is in cash.20
Insert Table VI About Here.
Table VI illustrates how average valuations of strategic and nancial bidders vary from
target to target. We sort targets in our sample based on each characteristic and calculate
average valuations of strategic and nancial bidders implied by Model II for targets in the
bottom and top quantiles of the sample. While average valuations of strategic bidders across
all targets in the sample are higher, many targets are valued more by an average nancial
bidder than by an average strategic bidder. These targets comprise a signicant fraction
of the sample: according to the estimates of Model II, a typical nancial bidder values the
target more than a typical strategic bidder in approximately one out of four takeover auctions
(precisely, 22.64%). This result contradicts the view that strategic bidders are always willing
to pay more because they can implement the same changes as nancial bidders, but can also
generate potential synergies or are willing to pay more due to agency conicts.
The ndings of Tables V and VI suggest the segmentation view of the takeover market.
Under this view, neither strategic nor nancial acquirers have a systematic advantage over
the other group. Instead, some targets are a better match for nancial bidders, and some {
for strategic bidders. This segmentation arises due to dierent advantages of strategic and
nancial bidders. Financial bidders are better than strategic bidders at reorganizing targets
and providing incentives to the management team. In addition, nancial bidders can use their
relationships and reputation to obtain debt nancing at more favorable terms, in line with
the evidence in Demiroglu and James (2010) and Ivashina and Kovner (2011) and the model
of Malenko and Malenko (2014). In contrast, strategic bidders can realize synergies from
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combining their operations with the target. Additionally, even without synergies, they may
be willing to pay more due to agency problems, such as managerial empire building. Because
both synergies and agency conicts are likely to be created in investment, this view implies
that strategic bidders have higher valuations than nancial bidders for targets with greater
investment opportunities. In contrast, nancial bidders have higher valuations than strategic
bidders for targets that perform worse and have fewer investment opportunities. Our ndings
are consistent with this view, because both R&D expenditures and cash balances are correlated
with investment opportunities (see, for example, Erickson and Whited (2000, 2006)), and cash
ows measure performance.21
The ranking of valuations of strategic and nancial bidders not only varies from target
to target but also changes with aggregate economic conditions. We employ two measures of
aggregate economic conditions, the return on the S&P 500 in the 12 months preceding the
takeover and the credit spread at the time of the takeover. While estimates of coecients
for strategic bidders are insignicant, both coecients are signicantly negative for nancial
bidders, suggesting that nancial bidders are willing to pay higher premiums over market
value after a period of low market returns and when debt is \cheap." The result for the
credit spread is consistent with recent ndings of Axelson et al. (2013) that both buyout
leverage and buyout pricing are negatively related to the market-wide credit risk premium of
leveraged loans at the time of the buyout. The result for past market returns is surprising
but is consistent with the view that nancial bidders are able to identify undervalued targets
and initiate contests for them. If a market downturn makes more targets undervalued relative
to fundamentals and nancial bidders have the expertise to spot them and initiate takeover
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auctions, their average valuations will be higher in downturns. Thus, nancial bidders can
provide a cushion to the market in downturns.22
If nancial bidders have an advantage over strategic bidders in debt nancing, their val-
uations should be associated with the target's leverage dierently. According to Table V,
valuations of strategic bidders are approximately 2:5 times more sensitive to target leverage
than valuations of nancial bidders. This result is consistent with the idea that nancial bid-
ders nd it easier to adjust the leverage of the target. We nd an inverted U-shaped relation
between leverage and valuations of both strategic and nancial bidders, and the shape (but
not the magnitude of the eect) is surprisingly similar for both types of bidders. According
to Model II, a marginal increase in leverage increases the valuation of a strategic (nancial)
bidder if leverage is below 41:35% (45:99%), and decreases the valuation if it is above this
amount. One potential explanation for this eect is that bidders value reasonable leverage
in targets more than the market because an acquisition helps lift the bidder's debt overhang.
On the other hand, too high leverage increases default risk of the merged company and is
thus undesirable. A caveat here is that, because a strategic bidder combines its debt with the
debt of the target, it is reasonable to expect that for such bidders, the joint rather than target
leverage matters for valuations. In results reported in the Internet Appendix, we estimate the
model with both target and joint leverage and nd that only joint leverage is signicant for
valuations of strategic bidders, and the relation is again inverted U-shaped.23
Finally, the results in Table V suggest that the importance of the unobserved component
of valuations is substantially dierent for strategic and nancial bidders. According to Model
II, we nd that the average impact of the private component of the valuation is 15:3% of
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the market value for nancial bidders and 25:8% for strategic bidders.24 This dierence is
little aected by adding industry dummies in the valuation model. This result suggests that
valuations of nancial bidders are rather closely tied to the observable characteristics of the
target, while valuations of strategic bidders are mostly based on whether a particular target is a
good t for a particular strategic bidder, which is not reected in the observable characteristics
of the target. In the Internet Appendix, we also estimate an extended model in which the
variance of the private component of valuations may be a function of target and economy-wide
characteristics. We nd the private component of strategic bidders to be more important (i.e.,
have a higher variance) for targets that are smaller and have high R&D expenditures, that
is, in situations in which the t of a particular bidder with the target is likely to be more
important.
The above result also has implications for theoretical modeling of bidder values in takeover
contests. If strategic bidders are the dominant contestants, as in models of mergers driven by
industry concentration, then the assumption of private values is more valid. If nancial bid-
ders are the major contestants, as in models of acquisitions driven by the underperformance
of the target's current management, then the assumption of public common values may be
more appropriate. Finally, models that allow for bidder asymmetries are likely to be more
appropriate to settings in which the two groups of bidders compete against each other. Ac-
counting for potential asymmetries between bidders is important because those can lead to
dierent implications for the eciency and optimality of selling procedures.
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V. Distribution of Takeover Gains
A question of utmost importance in the M&A literature is how the surplus from takeovers
is split between the acquirer and the target. Most of the existing literature addresses this
question by looking at the average returns to the acquirer and the target upon the takeover
announcement. The common conclusion is that average returns to targets are large and
positive, while average returns to acquirers are close to zero or even negative.25 These results
seem to suggest that most if not all gains from takeovers are accrued to targets. In addition
to the well-known concern that expectation of acquisition activity is already incorporated in
the acquirer's stock price,26 this approach does not allow for evaluation of gains to private
acquirers, which comprise a signicant group of strategic bidders and almost all nancial
bidders. Because our empirical strategy estimates valuations of all bidders and does not use
data on the acquirer's stock price, it allows us to address these concerns.
To analyze the distribution of takeover gains between targets and acquirers, we compare
the observed winning bids with the expected valuations of the winning bidders, conditional on
the characteristics of the target, the economy-wide variables, and the outcome of the auction:27
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By properties of order statistics, (7) can be computed as the expectation of a random variable
distributed according to a lognormal distribution with parameters X 0it1i and 
2
t1i
, truncated
at b1i from below. We use the estimation results of Model II to compute the estimates of the
expected valuations of the winning bidders, Ev^
(1)
i , for each takeover auction i in the sample.
30
This gives us the estimate of each acquirer's maximum willingness to pay for the target. By
comparing this gure with the actual winning bid for each takeover, we quantify the \winning
slack" of the winning bidder.
Insert Figure 2 About Here.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of the ratio of the winning bid to the estimate of the
expected valuation of the winning bidder for the samples of takeovers undertaken by strategic
and nancial acquirers. Strategic acquirers pay between 65:5% and 92:9% (on average, 85:1%)
of their expected maximum willingness to pay. Financial acquirers pay between 84:7% and
97:9% (on average, 92:7%) of their expected maximum willingness to pay. These results have
two implications. First, it appears that nancial bidders often pay close to their maximum
willingness to pay when acquiring the target. If a nancial bidder's valuation corresponds
to the present value of future proceeds from selling the reorganized company, discounted by
the appropriate cost of capital, this result suggests that nancial bidders are able to generate
returns only slightly above the required return. This interpretation is in line with the nding
of Kaplan and Schoar (2005) that average LBO fund returns (net of fees) are slightly below
the S&P 500 return.
Second, unlike nancial acquirers, strategic acquirers appear to have substantial winning
slack, underpaying on average 14:92% of their maximum willingness to pay (or, equivalently,
24:7% of the value of the target under the current management). Not only do strategic
acquirers pay on average higher premiums than nancial acquirers, but the maximum premi-
ums that they are willing to pay are considerably higher. If valuations of strategic acquirers
are solely dened by potential synergies from the acquisition and there is no anticipation
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of the takeover, we would expect to obtain the average acquirer's announcement returns of
approximately 3%.28 This gure contrasts with the evidence of approximately zero acquirer
announcement returns in takeovers.29 The dierence between these ndings is likely due to
two factors. First, future acquisition activity is likely partially captured in the acquirer's stock
price, before the acquisition occurs. For example, Song and Walkling (2008) nd that the av-
erage acquirer returns are signicantly positive at 0:69% for the sample of acquisitions that
are the rst in the industry in the last 12 months, which are arguably unanticipated. However,
because this number is signicantly below 3%, the anticipation eect alone is unlikely to ex-
plain the absence of acquirer announcement returns. The second factor that can help explain
the dierence is private benets of control. If managers of strategic bidders obtain private
benets from undertaking acquisitions, then we would expect their maximum willingness to
pay for the target to be above the price at which the acquirer shareholders' gains from the
acquisition are zero.30 In this case, strategic bidders are willing to overpay for targets, which
would lead to substantial winning slack that is not reected in the shareholders' wealth.
VI. Approach Validity
In this section, we examine the validity of our empirical approach. First, we study the
overall t of the model. We simulate auction outcomes using the estimation results and nd
that the simulated outcomes are similar to what we observe in the data. Thus, we conclude
that the model performs reasonably well at capturing the takeover outcomes observed in the
data. A detailed description of the simulations and results is provided in Appendix C.
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Next, we present several robustness checks of the estimation procedure. Our estimation
results are based on four assumptions: Assumptions 1 to 3 and normality of the distribution
of private component of valuations. While Assumption 1 must hold in all auctions by the
denition of the maximum willingness to pay, the other assumptions can be violated in some
contexts. We alter these assumptions one by one and re-estimate Model II. We nd that our
results are largely robust.
First, we alter Assumption 2. If submitting a bid is costly, a bidder can choose to let the
opponent win at a price below the bidder's valuation. For example, if a bidder's valuation is
only slightly above the opponent's bid, potential gains from submitting a higher bid can be
below the bidding cost. Alternatively, the winning bid is not necessarily an upper bound on
losing bidders' valuations if the winner has made a strategic preemptive bid. To see whether
our results are robust to these concerns, we relax Assumption 2: instead of assuming that
a bidder does not allow an opponent to win at a price below the bidder's valuation, we
assume that a bidder does not allow an opponent to win if the bidder's valuation exceeds the
opponent's bid by more than ve percentage points of the target's value under the current
management. This increases the upper bound on the valuation of a losing bidder from bi;1 to
bi;1+0:05. Table VII, Model IV presents estimates of the modied model and shows that the
results of Section IV are robust to this modication.
Insert Table VII About Here.
Second, we alter Assumption 3. If there is a chance that the target's shareholders agree
to sell the company at a price below the value under the current management, then bidding
behavior can violate Assumption 3. This may happen, for example, in the presence of pressure
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from a large shareholder of the target. In addition, our measure of the target's value under
the current management can be imprecise. To see whether our estimation results are robust
to these concerns, we relax Assumption 3: instead of assuming that a bidder does not make
an informal bid if her valuation is below the target's value under the current management,
we assume that a bidder does not make an informal bid if her valuation is below 90% of the
target's value under the current management. This decreases the lower bound on the valuation
of a losing bidder who submitted an informal bid from one to 0:9. Table VII, Model V presents
the modied estimates, which indicate that our results are also robust to this modication.
Finally, we alter the assumption that the private component of valuations, "i;j, is dis-
tributed normally. This assumption is a natural starting point of the analysis but can be
criticized if one believes that the distribution of potential synergies exhibits fat tails. To
check the robustness of our results to presence of fat tails, we replace the assumption of a
Normal distribution of "i;j with that of a central t-distribution with known degrees of freedom
. We assume s = f = 5.
31 The estimates, presented in Table VII, Model VI, suggest that
most results of the baseline model are robust to the distributional assumption.
In the Internet Appendix, we provide further discussion of other less explicit identication
assumptions and sample selection, and argue that most of our results are unlikely to be
overturned with reasonable alternative assumptions in place.
VII. Concluding Remarks
Potential acquirers are usually classied into two broad groups, strategic bidders and
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nancial bidders. This paper studies how the two groups of bidders dier with respect to
valuations of potential takeover targets. We use hand-collected data from SEC lings on
formal and informal bids as well as on bidders' types to estimate valuations of participating
strategic and nancial bidders in auctions of companies. We nd that while strategic bidders
on average have higher valuations than nancial bidders across all targets, the two types of
bidders are inherently dierent. First, a signicant subset of targets is systematically valued
more by nancial bidders. These appear to be targets that perform poorly and have few
investment opportunities. Higher target valuations of nancial bidders can stem from greater
expertise in dealing with poorly-managed mature companies and from access to cheaper debt
nancing. Second, valuations of dierent nancial bidders are considerably less dispersed
than valuations of dierent strategic bidders. Finally, valuations of nancial bidders appear
to be correlated more by aggregate economic conditions, such as the cost of debt and recent
stock market performance. Taken together, our results support the market segmentation view,
according to which which dierent targets appeal to dierent groups of bidders.
Several potential avenues for future research could be interesting. First, one could look
at further links between bidders' valuations and the takeover premiums paid by strategic
and nancial bidders. It is well known that strategic acquirers pay more for targets they
acquire than nancial acquirers. In this paper, we show that this observation is consistent
with two of our results. First, it is consistent with higher valuations of strategic bidders.
Second, it is consistent with higher heterogeneity of strategic bidders: because valuations of
strategic bidders within the auction are more dierent from each other, the winning bidder's
valuation exceeds the valuation of the average strategic bidder by a larger amount, resulting
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in a higher takeover premium. Future research could evaluate the importance of each of
these eects in explaining the observed dierence in takeover premiums paid by strategic and
nancial bidders. Second, there exists considerable heterogeneity in the number of bidders in
each auction. A potential avenue for future research would be to look at the sources of this
heterogeneity, and at the dierences in participation decisions between strategic and nancial
bidders. Finally, it could be interesting to study what selling mechanisms are optimal in
the presence of two distinct categories of bidders. Symmetric auction formats are typically
suboptimal for the seller in the presence of bidder asymmetries. However, it is not obvious
how the optimal selling mechanisms would look like in the complex takeover market.32
Appendix A. Example of a Takeover Auction
This appendix provides extracts from the background of the sale process of Manor Care. The
text is taken from the SEC lings.
At a meeting of the board held on April 10, 2007, our board of directors considered a review of our
strategic plan and potential alternatives to maximize shareholder value. ... After further discussions
between members of the board and our management, the board determined at the meeting that it was
advisable and in the best interests of Manor Care and our stockholders to further explore strategic
alternatives to enhance shareholder value, including through a potential sale of Manor Care. We
retained JPMorgan as nancial advisor, and Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP (\Cravath") as legal
counsel, to Manor Care and the board. We announced our board's determination to explore strategic
alternatives to enhance shareholder value in an April 11, 2007 press release.
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JPMorgan also began to contact potential strategic and nancial acquirors to gauge their interest
in acquiring Manor Care. Over the course of the following weeks, JPMorgan contacted 48 potential
acquirors, including 10 potential strategic acquirors, to assess their interest in acquiring Manor Care.
... We subsequently executed condentiality agreements with 21 potential nancial acquirors and
two potential strategic acquirors. At the regular meeting of our board of directors on May 8, 2007,
... representatives of JPMorgan also updated the board on the progress of the potential sale of the
company process, noting that, of the 23 parties that had entered into condentiality agreements,
eight potential nancial acquirors and two potential strategic acquirors had provided preliminary
indications of interest to JPMorgan. ... During the course of their due diligence process and prior
to the submission of nal acquisition proposals, all but two of the potential buyers dropped out of
the process. On June 8, 2007, JPMorgan distributed a bid procedures letter and a draft merger
agreement to the seven potential nancial acquirors and one potential strategic acquiror that were
still actively engaged in the process.
By June 25, 2007, Carlyle and one continuing strategic acquiror submitted proposals for the
acquisition of Manor Care, together with debt nancing commitments and comments on the draft
merger agreement and, in the case of Carlyle, an equity nancing commitment and sponsor guarantee.
Carlyle oered merger consideration of $67.00 per share in cash, while the potential strategic acquiror
oered merger consideration of $65.00 per share divided equally between cash and the acquiror's
common stock. ... With respect to the potential sale of the company process, representatives of
JPMorgan and Cravath discussed with the board, in light of the proposals made by each of the
potential acquirors, the process to solicit improved terms from the potential acquirors. ... The board
also directed JPMorgan and Cravath to seek improved terms from each of the potential acquirors.
... Prior to the meeting of the board on the morning of June 28, 2007 described below, Carlyle orally
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informed JPMorgan that it was increasing its proposal to a best and nal oer of $67.50 per share ...
. The potential strategic acquiror informed Manor Care in writing that it was not willing to increase
its oer price any further.
Management and JPMorgan informed the board that, in responding to questions raised by Carlyle
in the course of the due diligence process, management and JPMorgan had determined that a sale of
Manor Care would give rise to additional costs in connection with the termination of certain options
purchased and warrants issued by Manor Care with respect to its common stock in connection with
Manor Care's 2.125% convertible senior notes due 2035. ... In order to oset the option value cost in
the context of a sale of Manor Care (which cost Manor Care and its hedge counterparty had agreed
to x at $47 million), Carlyle submitted a revised oer to purchase Manor Care for $67.00 per share.
On the evening of July 1, 2007, our board met to review Manor Care's strategic alternatives and
the revised nancial and legal terms that had been proposed by Carlyle. ... Following additional
discussion and deliberation, our board of directors determined that, based on all information available
to the board, a sale of Manor Care to Carlyle at $67.00 per share would provide our stockholders
with greater value than any of Manor Care's other strategic alternatives, and the board unanimously
... approved the merger agreement with an entity sponsored by Carlyle, the merger and the other
transactions contemplated by the merger agreement, authorized Manor Care to enter into the merger
agreement and resolved to recommend that our stockholders vote to adopt the merger agreement.
The merger agreement was executed by Manor Care, Inc. and MCHCR-CP Merger Sub Inc. as of
July 2, 2007. On July 2, 2007, before the opening of trading on the NYSE, Manor Care and Carlyle
issued a joint press release announcing the merger.
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Appendix B. Estimation Methodology
A. Estimation of Fully Observable Bidder Types
Consider auction i. First, suppose that information on the type of all Ni bidders is observed
by the researcher,33 and thus, there are Ns;i strategic bidders and Nf;i nancial bidders, such that
Ns;i + Nf;i = Ni. Suppose further that bidders within each auction are sorted in descending order
by the maximum bid, as described in Section II.C. Let bi;j and ti;j denote their maximum bids and
types correspondingly.
The likelihoods of events from Section II for each auction i are then:
1. Bidder 1 submits formal bid bi;1 and wins an auction. By Assumption 1, the likelihood of this
event is
li;1(vi;1jXi; bi;1; ti;1; ) = Pfbi;1  vi;1jXi; ti;1; g = P
(
log
bi;1
Mi
 Xiti;1
ti;1
 "i;1
)
= 1  
 
log
bi;1
Mi
 Xiti;1
ti;1
!
: (B1)
2. Bidder j > 1 submits formal bid bi;j and loses to bidder 1. By Assumptions 1 and 2,
li;j(vi;j jXi; bi;j ; ti;j ; ) = Pfbi;j  vi;j  bi;1jXi; ti;j ; g = P
(
log
bi;j
Mi
 Xiti;j
ti;j
 "i;j 
log
bi;1
Mi
 Xiti;j
ti;j
)
= 
 
log
bi;1
Mi
 Xiti;j
ti;j
!
  
 
log
bi;j
Mi
 Xiti;j
ti;j
!
: (B2)
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3. Bidder j > 1 submits informal bid of any size and loses to bidder 1. By Assumptions 1{3,
li;j(vi;j jXi; bi;j ; ti;j ; ) = PfMi  vi;j  bi;1jXi; ti;j ; g = P
(
 Xiti;j
ti;j
 "i;j 
log
bi;1
Mi
 Xiti;j
ti;j
)
= 
 
log
bi;1
Mi
 Xiti;j
ti;j
!
  
 Xiti;j
ti;j

: (B3)
4. Bidder j > 1 does not submit any bid. If the bidder does not inform the target about this
decision, then by Assumptions 1 and 2,
li;j(vi;j jXi; bi;j ; ti;j ; ) = Pf0  vi;j  bi;1jXi; ti;j ; g = P
(
 1  "i;j 
log
bi;1
Mi
 Xiti;j
ti;j
)
= 
 
log
bi;1
Mi
 Xiti;j
ti;j
!
: (B4)
If the bidder informs the target that her valuation is below the market value of the company
under its current management mi, then by Assumption 1,
li;j(vi;j jXi; bi;j ; ti;j ; ) = Pf0  vi;j MijXi; ti;j ; g = P

 1  "i;j 
 Xiti;j
ti;j

= 
 Xiti;j
ti;j

: (B5)
The likelihood function for auction i with observable bidder types can be written as
Li(vijNs;i; Nf;i; Nu;i; Xi; bi; ti; ) =
NiY
j=1
li;j(vi;j jXi; bi;j ; ti;j ; ); (B6)
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so that the complete log-likelihood function of the model with fully observable data is given by
L(vjNs; Nf ; Nu; X; b; t; ) = 1PI
i=1Ni
IX
i=1
Li(vijNs;i; Nf;i; Nu;i; Xi; bi; ti; )
=
1PI
i=1Ni
IX
i=1
NiX
j=1
log li;j(vi;j jXi; bi;j ; ti;j ; ): (B7)
Denote N =
PI
i=1Ni. From the theory of ML estimators, and slightly abusing notation
(Li(vijNs;i; Nf;i; Nu;i; Xi; bi; ti; )  Li()),
p
N(^   ) d! N (0; I 1()) (B8)
I() =  p lim
N!1
NX
i=1
d2Li()
dd0
= p lim
N!1
NX
i=1
dLi()
d
dLi()
d0
: (B9)
The asymptotic condence interval for parameter k 2  is given by
"
^ + q
N (0;1)
=2
r
1
N
I 1(^); ^ + qN (0;1)1 =2
r
1
N
I 1(^)
#
: (B10)
B. Estimation with Partially Unobservable Bidder Types
Consider the estimation framework of Section II.C, but now suppose that bidder type is unob-
servable for some bidders. Let Ns;i and Nf;i be the observable number of strategic and nancial
bidders in auction i, and Nu;i = Ni   Ns;i   Nf;i  0 be the number of bidders with unobservable
type. Denote by Ui and Oi the set of unobservable and observable bidders in auction i. With par-
tially unobservable data, Oi contains at least bidder 1 { the winner's identity and type are always
known. The rest of the framework follows that of Section II.C.
One straightforward way to deal with unobserved data is to maximize the likelihood function
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(B7), treating all possible unobservable types ti;j as additional parameters of estimation that can
take values fs; fg, and nd the set of types that provides the highest function value. This approach
is computationally unfeasible in all but the most simple setups. As an alternative, we use a method
similar to the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm, which dates back to Dempster, Laird, and
Rubin (1977) and in recent years has been extended in many ways to deal with the unobserved latent
data.34 The method allows us to iteratively solve the following two-step problem. In the rst step,
the probability P fti;j jZi; g that a bidder of type ti;j 2 fs; fg enters an auction is calculated from
the observable data. The vector of target characteristics Zi that aects this probability includes Xi.
It also contains the information about auction outcomes available to the researcher (e.g., winning
bid, winning bidder's type, total number of bidders). In the second step, the expected likelihood
function is maximized with respect to structural parameters. In this function, the likelihood of each
missing observation is substituted with the expected likelihood E [li;j(vi;j jXi; bi;j ; ti;j ; )jti;j ], which
is the weighted sum of the likelihoods conditional on the type ti;j being observable with probability
weights of each ti;j given by the rst step's estimate.
The two-step EM algorithm for a model with partially unobservable data proceeds as follows:
1. Calculate tted values P^s(Z 0i^) = P (ti;j = sjZi; ^) 2 [0; 1] of the exible parametric regression
for the probability that a losing bidder is strategic,
Ps;i;j =  (Z 0i; i;j); j > 1; (B11)
where Ps;i;j is equal to one if the observed type of bidder j in auction i is strategic, and is equal
to zero if its type is nancial. Also, compute P^f (Z 0i^) = 1  P^s(Z 0i^). For our purposes,   can
be any function that limits its values to [0,1], for example, Logistic or Probit-like function. We
42
provide more details on the likelihood function that is estimated in the rst step in Section C
of this appendix.
2. (a) Construct the expected log-likelihood function for auction i as
Li(vijNs;i; Nf;i; Nu;i; Xi; bi; ti; ) = logE[Li(vijNs;i; Nf;i; Nu;i; Xi; bi; ti; )jti]; (B12)
where, because types are independent across all the bidders in the economy,
E[Li(vijNs;i; Nf;i; Nu;i; Xi; bi; ti; )jti] =
NiY
j=1
E[li;j(vi;j jXi; bi;j ; ti;j ; )jti;j ] (B13)
=
Y
j2Oi
li;j(vi;j jXi; bi;j ; ti;j ; )
Y
j2Ui
X
ti;j2fs;fg
li;j(vi;j jXi; bi;j ; ti;j ; )Pti;j (Z 0i^):
That is, the likelihood function of auction i is the product of the likelihoods of bidders
with observable and unobservable types, such that the likelihood of the unobservable
type is the weighted sum of the likelihoods conditional on type ti;j being observable with
probability weights obtained on the rst step.
(b) Maximize
L(vjNs; Nf ; Nu; X; b; t; ) = 1PI
i=1Ni
IX
i=1
Li(vijNs;i; Nf;i; Nu;i; Xi; bi; ti; ) (B14)
with respect to .
The winning bidder is excluded from the calculations of P^s(Z 0i^) and P^f (Z 0i^) because of the
potentially large bias that perfect knowledge of the winner in each auction introduces to the estima-
tion. Consider a simple example. For every i, suppose that X 0is  X 0if , s = f , and Oi = f1g,
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that is, only the winning bidder's type is observed. Also, suppose that the true probability that a
bidder's type is strategic is Ps =  ((1 Zi)0  (1 0 ::: 0)) { a constant. As Z varies, similar fractions of
strategic and nancial bidders participate, but the estimation of the probability of the bidder's type
will always give P^s(Z 0i^) ' 1 and P^f (Z 0i^) ' 0, as valuations of strategic bidders dominate those of
nancial bidders in this example. As a result, the rst step estimation predicts unobserved bidder
types with bias.
C. Recovering Types of Bidders for Bidders with Missing Informa-
tion
Suppose that in auction i, a losing bidder is strategic with probability Ps =  (Z 0i). The number
of losing strategic bidders in an auction with Ni bidders, Nu;i of which have unobserved type,
is distributed as Bernoulli ((Ni  Nu;i) (Z 0i); (Ni  Nu;i) (Z 0i; ) (1   (Z 0i; ))). The probability
that Ns;i losing bidders are strategic in such an auction is then
PfNs;ijNi; Nu;i; Zi; g = CNs;iNi  (Z 0i)Ns;i
 
1   (Z 0i)
Ni Nu;i Ns;i : (B15)
Dene Ns = (Ns;1; Ns;2; :::; Ns;I)
0, N = (N1; N2; :::; NI)0, and Nu = (Nu;1; Nu;2; :::; Nu;I)0. The com-
plete likelihood function of the model that recovers the bidder type for losing bidders with missing
information is
L(NsjN;Nu; Z; ) =
IY
i=1
C
Ns;i
Ni
 (Z 0i)
Ns;i
 
1   (Z 0i)
Ni Nu;i Ns;i : (B16)
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Taking the logarithm,
L(NsjN;Nu; Z; ) =
IX
i=1
C
Ns;i
Ni
 (Z 0i)
Ns;i
 
1   (Z 0i)
Ni Nu;i Ns;i
= const+
IX
i=1
Ns;i log  (Z
0
i) +
IX
i=1
(N  Nu;i  Ns;i) log(1   (Z 0i))
= const+
IX
i=1
Ns;iX
j=1
log  (Z 0i) +
IX
i=1
Nf;iX
j=1
Nf;i log(1   (Z 0i)); (B17)
because Ns;i +Nf;i +Nu;i = Ni for every i. Maximizing (B17) with respect to , we obtain the ML
estimate ^ and the projected probability of a losing bidder being strategic P^s(Z 0i^).
D. Details of Numerical Procedures
Because of the unobservability of types, the complete likelihood of the model may be nonconvex
and as such may have multiple local maxima. To address this problem, we use the following two-step
numerical procedure to nd the global maximum:
1. The original starting point (0) is obtained from economic considerations. The likelihood is
rst optimized using the simulated annealing method, which allows us to safely escape local
maxima that are substantially far away from the global maximum. This step simulates the set
of parameters (k); k = 1; :::; 30; 000 using the modied Accept-Reject method and nds the
intermediary optimum .35
2. Use  as the starting point for the simplex method optimization (see, for example, Nelder and
Mead (1967)). This method can also escape local maxima and is in general ecient in nding
the global maximum if the starting point is suciently close to it, which is ensured by the rst
numerical step. The optimization continues until a new intermediary optimum is found, and
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then is repeatedly restarted using the newly obtained optimum as the starting point until the
sequential optima coincide. The nal iteration of the simplex method gives ^.
The combination of methods performs consistently well in the simulated data, for which the true
valuation parameters are known, even for original starting points substantially far away from the
true maximum.
Appendix C. Discussion of Approach Validity
A. Overall Performance of the Model
Table CI examines the t of the model.36 We use the estimates of Model II to simulate valuations
and outcomes of 34; 900 takeover auctions (100 simulated auctions for each target in the sample).
More specically, for each auction we simulate the uninformed bidder types using the estimates of
the Logit model in Table IV and valuations of all participating bidders using the estimates of the
valuations model in Table V. Then, for each simulated auction we determine its outcome: the
type of the winning bidder and the takeover premium. By Assumptions 1 to 3, the type of
the winning bidder is equal to the type of the bidder with the highest valuation. The takeover
premium is not uniquely determined, because our assumptions imply only bounds on it. The
lower bound on the winning bid (normalized by the value of the target under the current
management) is the maximum of the second-highest bidder's valuation among all participants
and one:
Winning Bid LBi = max
h
v
(2)
i ; 1
i
; (C1)
where v
(j)
i denotes the j
th-highest valuation in simulated auction i. The winning bid must
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be above the second-highest valuation by Assumption 2, as otherwise the bidder with the
second-highest valuation would be willing to beat the winner's oer. In addition, the winning
bid must be above one, as otherwise the shareholders of the target are better o not selling
the company at all. The upper bound on the winning bid is the valuation of the winning
bidder, which is the highest bidder's valuation among all participants:
Winning Bid UBi = v
(1)
i : (C2)
The winning bid must be below the winner's valuation by Assumption 1, as otherwise the
winner would pay more than she is willing to. Having recorded the outcomes of the simulated
auctions, we compare their summary statistics (presented in Table CI) with the corresponding
sample values presented in Table I.
Table CI shows that the simulations produce outcomes that are similar to what we observe
in the data. Strategic bidders win auctions more often than nancial bidders, despite the fact
that a typical auction has more nancial bidders than strategic bidders. As in the data, there
are fewer bidders in takeovers won by strategic bidders than in takeovers won by nancial
bidders: 11:7 versus 14:5 bidders on average compared to 9:9 versus 16:5 bidders in the data.
The average winning premium in the data is within the bounds for the samples of all auctions
and auctions won by strategic bidders, and slightly above the upper bound in auctions won
by nancial bidders.37 More precisely, the model predicts the average target premium in
takeover auctions to be between 30:2% and 52:4%, which is consistent with the observed
average takeover premium of 42:5%. For the sample of takeovers undertaken by strategic
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(nancial) acquirers, the model predicts the average takeover premium to be between 32:9%
and 59:1% (23:5% and 35:5%), while the sample average takeover premium in the data is
46:4% (36:5%).
Thus, we conclude that the model performs reasonably well at capturing the takeover
outcomes observed in the data. Note that our estimation procedure relies on all bids rather
than only winning bids, so the fact that simulations produce takeover outcomes that are
similar to what we observe in the data is not trivial.
B. Our Model of Takeover Auctions versus Linear Regression of
the Takeover Premium versus The Button Model
In this section, we examine performance of the estimator obtained using our incomplete
model of English auctions with three assumptions on bidding behavior. We simulate articial
data with bidding patterns that are poorly approximated by any particular structure and that
to some extent resemble bidding patterns in takeover auctions. For simplicity, we continue to
use the terms \strategic" and \nancial" to dierentiate between the two types of bidders. In
the course of each simulated auction, we allow strategic and nancial bidders to arrive with new
oers in random sequence and submit bids (both informal and formal) with discrete increment
of random size. To focus on the performance of the valuation model only, we keep bidder
type known in the resulting data set.38 We consider three dierent parameterizations of the
simulation procedure that dier in the distribution of observable target characteristics across
auctions and the number of auction participants. Specically, we simulate three data sets, each
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containing I = 200 auctions, and each corresponding to the following three parameterizations:
1. All auctions have from N i = 2 to N i = 8 bidders with equal probability; two valu-
ation shifters (observable target characteristics) Xi = (Xi;1; Xi;2)
0 are Xi;1 = 1 (xed
component of valuation) and Xi;2  N (X ; 2X), where (X ; X) = (0; 0:4).
2. (X ; X) = (0; 1:2), with the rest of the parametrization the same as in the rst
parametrization;
3. N i = 4, with the rest of the parametrization the same as in the rst parametrization.
For each bidder, the probability of being strategic is Ps = 0:3. The market value of the target
is simulated as Mi = exp(N (M ; 2M)), where (M ; M) = (4; 0:5). The true parameter set is
s = (s;1; s;2)
0 = (0:1; 0:1)0, f = (f;1; f;2)0 = (0:1; 0:5)0, s = 0:25, and f = 0:15.
Bidders start to make oers knowing thatMi is the lowest bid that will be accepted, and are
chosen to come up with new oers at random. To capture discreteness of bid increments, we
set the minimum bid increment equal to Mi=100. Bidders choose the size of the increment at
random, uniformly from a discrete set of values fMi=100; 2Mi=100; :::; 10Mi=100g. If bidder
j's valuation is such that vi;j < bi;max + kMi=100, where k  10; k 2 N, and bi;max is the
current highest bid, the bidder will rationally choose from a subset fMi=100; 2Mi=100; :::; (k 
1)Mi=100g. If k < 1, the bidder drops out of the auction.
The simulated data are estimated using three empirical methods: our model, a linear
OLS model of takeover premiums, and a button model, which assumes that each bidder
continuously increases its oers up to the valuation. The results are presented in Table CII.
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The results produced by the incomplete model of English auctions are close, both economically
and statistically, to the true valuation parameters. In contrast, the results of the linear model
and the structural button model are widely inconsistent.
First, consider a linear model. Because takeover premiums are complex functions of all
bidders' valuations, this takeover premium regression lacks identication to reliably distinguish
among dierent factors that separately shape valuations of strategic and nancial bidders.
Takeover premiums tend to be above the average bidder valuations, more so if the number
of bidders in the auction is higher. This is evidenced by overestimated mean valuations, s;1
and f;1, for every parametrization of the simulated data, and by overall higher coecients
for the parametrization presented in Table CII, Panel A as compared to Panel B, in which
the average number of participants across auctions is smaller. Moreover, a simple change
in the data properties can substantially aect all coecients: an increase in the variance
of X2 in the parametrization presented in Table CII, Panel C, as compared to Panel A,
increases (decreases) both the average and the variance of takeover premiums paid by nancial
(strategic) bidders,39 which under the linear model results in an inverse relationship between
the estimated magnitudes of private valuations, s and f , for the two types of bidders. Finally,
takeover premiums paid by strategic and nancial bidders tend to dier by approximately the
same amount across auctions, as reected in a reduced and almost insignicant dierence
between s;2 and f;2, compared to true values, for the two parameterizations. Second, to a
smaller extent, the same problems plague estimation results of the button model in which, for
all bidders with formal oers except the winner, valuations are still assumed to be equal to
their bids.
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Notes
1For example, Boone and Mulherin (2007b) nd that the fraction of takeovers in the form
of auctions in their sample is 50%. Even though public competing bids are rare, a more
detailed analysis of deal backgrounds reveals substantial competition via nonpublic bids.
2For example, see \Selling to a strategic or nancial buyer" by Rebecca Pomering in
Financial Advisor 's May 2006 issue.
3 Thompson, Mark E., and Michael O'Brien, \Who has the advantage: Strategic buyers
or private equity funds?" Financier Worldwide, November 2005.
4See Chowdhry and Nanda (1993), Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999), and Povel and
Singh (2010), who model takeover contests as button auctions, and Fishman (1988, 1989),
Avery (1998), and Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998) for models, in which jump bids occur in
equilibrium.
5It is also consistent with the nding by Ahern (2012) that targets and strategic acquirers
share merger gains.
6Related, Haddad, Loualiche, and Plosser (2013) nd a negative relation between buyout
activity and aggregate expected excess returns. See also Axelson, Stromberg, and Weisbach
(2009), who rationalize the nancial structure of private equity transactions. Axelson et al.
(2013) point that this theory can explain their ndings.
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7Some bidders, for example, strategic bidders operating in the same industry as the target
or nancial bidders with expertise in the industry, can learn their valuations to a large extent
even prior to the due diligence process.
8Without loss of generality, rational bidders in this paper include bidders with behavioral
values for the target (i.e., bidders can be overoptimistic about the target), as long as such
bidders do not overbid above their behavioral valuations, and will want to outbid anyone who
is about to win an auction at a lower price.
9Sometimes targets do not inform bidders about a better oer. Even in this case, bidders
have an opportunity to respond to the highest bid by making a public oer once the private
stage of the auction is over. Such response is likely to entail additional costs. Thus, a bidder
may allow an opponent to win at a price below the valuation if the dierence is not too big.
In Section VI, we present a robustness check that alters Assumption 2 this way.
10If bidder j submitted several formal bids in the course of the auction, bi;j denotes the
highest formal bid.
11Almost always, the bidder does not inform the target about the reason for not submitting
a bid. However, in several cases in our sample, a bidder who does not submit a bid informs
the target that this is because her valuation is below the company's market value mi. We
dierentiate between these two groups during the estimation. Section A of Appendix B
provides the details.
12Before 2000, detailed information on the composition of competition was rarely provided
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in deal backgrounds; whenever it was provided, the pool of competitors was more often divided
into public and private bidders than strategic and nancial bidders. Although private bidders
are more likely to be nancial bidders, the absence of a one-to-one correspondence and lower
overall quality prevent us from using older data.
13The Internet Appendix is available in the online version of the article on the Journal of
Finance website. An even safer approach would be to eliminate all auctions with at least
one noncash bid. However, a noncash losing bid provides information about the valuation of
only this bidder, while a noncash winning bid provides information about the valuations of all
bidders in the auction, since it serves as an upper bound on those valuations. Thus, a noncash
losing bid introduces a much smaller econometric problem. The downside of eliminating
auctions with any non-cash bids is the reduction in the number of bidders in the sample. As
a robustness check, we estimated the model on a sample of auctions in which all formal bids
are in cash and obtained similar results.
14Whenever the target has dual-class stock (six cases) or a stock split after the snapshot of
the market price is taken but before the takeover announcement (two cases), we compute the
market value as the weighted average of dual-class stock prices or the proportion of the price
before the stock split, respectively.
15A press release occurred for 100 out of 349 targets. In almost all cases it increased the
stock price of the target.
16As a robustness check, we also calculated Mi as the market value three months prior to
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the day of the takeover announcement and obtained similar results.
17The \Finance" industry from the standard 12-industry classication does not contain any
rms due its exclusion from the sample of targets.
18In the rst specication, vector Zi containsXi and auction outcomes; in the second one, Zi
is updated with industry xed eects following the classication of Fama and French (1997).
We also estimated (6) using the Probit model and obtained similar results.
19In Model III we follow the ve-industry classication instead of the 11-industry classi-
cation because many industries in the 11-industry classication have few observations in our
sample, as evident from Table I.
20As a robustness check, we also collected data on auctions in which the winning bid is
in combination of cash and stock with the fraction of cash in the total bid exceeding 50%.
Consistent with selection driving the size coecient, the coecient on size for strategic bid-
ders decreases to -0.024. The other coecients are largely unaected. Alternatively, size
coecients can be dierent because synergies from mergers of two operating companies can
have decreasing returns to scale, while an increase in eciency from acquisition by a nancial
bidder can be multiplicative.
21Following Harford (1999), we normalize cash balances by dividing them by the book value
of assets. We also estimated the model dividing cash balances by the market value of assets
and obtained similar results. All coecients are similar in magnitude, but the coecients on
cash for nancial bidders becomes signicant.
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22We also simulate auction outcomes without nancial bidders participating in takeover
auctions. We estimate that in the absence of nancial bidders, the average takeover premium
decreases by 6% to 8% of the market value of the target, and the eect is greater in downturns
and for targets valued more by nancial bidders. See the Internet Appendix for details.
23Because we do not observe the identity and hence the characteristics of a strategic bidder
unless it makes a public bid, such estimation has to rely on strong assumptions. Our estimation
strategy is based on the assumption that a strategic bidder of unknown identity is drawn
randomly from the set of U.S. public corporations in the same two-digit SIC industry as the
target. See the Internet Appendix for a description of methodology and results.
24Because valuations of bidders are log-normally distributed, conditional on publicly observ-
able characteristics of the target, their conditional standard deviations are equal to
p
e
2
t   1,
t 2 fS; Fg. For the base model, this implies a conditional standard deviation of pe0:2582   1 =
26:24% for valuations of strategic bidders and
p
e0:1532   1 = 15:39% for valuations of nancial
bidders.
25See, for example, Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) for early evidence and Andrade,
Mitchell, and Staord (2001) and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) for recent updates.
26See Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) for a discussion, and Song and Walkling (2000),
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), and Cai, Song, and Walkling (2011) for approaches to
address this problem.
27Number of strategic bidders, number of nancial bidders, type of the winning bidder, and
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size of the winning bid.
28The acquirer's abnormal return would be the dierence between its maximum willingness
to pay and the price paid, multiplied by the relative size of the target. Given that the median
size of a target is around 12% of the size of the acquirer in the sample of acquisitions of
public U.S. companies by public U.S. companies (Andrade, Mitchell, and Staord (2001)),
the implied announcement return is around 0:12 24:7%  3%.
29See Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) for a review of the evidence. The announce-
ment returns for public acquirers in our sample are in line with those in the prior literature.
For example, the CAPM-adjusted average abnormal announcement return in our sample is
 0:231% in the (-1,+1) window around the announcement date and  0:018% in the (-3,+3)
window. Both values are statistically insignicantly dierent from zero.
30The private benets of managers could be due to empire building (Jensen (1986)) or eects
on compensation through M&A bonuses and future stock and option grants. See Grinstein
and Hribar (2004) and Harford and Li (2007) for empirical evidence.
31Liu (2004) shows that ML estimators of so-called \robit" models, to which ours is similar,
are robust if the number of degrees of freedom in the t-distribution is known, and suggests
the use of ve to seven degrees of freedom.
32Povel and Singh (2006) make a contribution in this direction, showing that when two
bidders are asymmetrically informed about the target, a sequential procedure in which the
target rst oers an exclusive deal to a better informed bidder is optimal.
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33By assuming complete type observability, this section lays down basic building blocks of
our identication strategy. Section B of Appendix B deals with the more complicated case in
which some losing bidders' type is not observable.
34See McLachlan and Krishnan (2008) for a comprehensive overview of EM methods.
35More details on the parametrization of the simulated annealing procedure are available
from the authors upon request.
36Because we use all the bids, not just the winning bids, in our estimation, bidders' intrinsic
valuations are estimated more precisely. However, the t of the winning bid alone implied by
the model might diverge from that observed in the data, if the losing bids carry substantially
dierent information than the winning bids. Therefore, the t of the model can be checked by
looking at whether simulations of the model produce auction outcomes that closely resemble
the data.
37Both sample and simulated takeover premiums have high standard deviations, so the
fact that the observed average of the takeover premium is slightly above the upper boundary
implied by the model is not surprising.
38The results are similar if we implement partially unobservable types, that is, randomly
\forget" the true type for a subset of losing bidders in the simulated data, consistent with our
assumption about the actual data.
39Financial bidders start to win more often and on average more easily against strategic
bidders due to a higher sensitivity of their valuations to X2.
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Table I.
Descriptive Statistics of Bidder Participation in All Auctions, Auctions Won by
Strategic versus Financial Bidders, and Across Industries
The table shows descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, and median) of bidder
participation for auctions won by dierent types of bidders and across 11 industries, as
classied by Fama and French (1997). Number is the number of auctions. Total is the
number of bidders who signed condentiality agreements, which is composed of Strategic
bidders, Financial bidders, and Unknown bidders, those for whom information about
their type is not provided in deal backgrounds. The winning bid is in units of the target's
value under the current management. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Medians are reported in brackets. The sample covers 01/01/2000 to 09/06/2008.
Number Total Strategic Financial Unknown Winning Bid
All Auctions 349 12.507 2.269 3.453 6.785 1.425
(15.493) (2.910) (8.236) (12.574) (0.323)
[6.000] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000] [1.339]
Won by Strategic Bidder 211 9.886 2.706 1.370 5.810 1.464
(12.637) (2.486) (4.154) (11.251) (0.324)
[5.000] [2.000] [0.000] [1.000] [1.380]
Won by Financial Bidder 138 16.514 1.601 6.638 8.275 1.365
(18.390) (3.360) (11.356) (14.279) (0.315)
[9.000] [1.000] [2.000] [1.000] [1.306]
t-statistic of Dierence 3.991 -3.524 6.143 1.796 -2.827
Consumer Nondurables 13 17.154 1.000 9.308 6.846 1.492
(17.573) (0.707) (17.895) (6.926) (0.593)
Consumer Durables 4 18.250 4.000 7.000 7.250 1.415
(16.520) (1.633) (9.695) (13.200) (0.650)
Manufacturing 25 29.360 3.480 7.120 18.760 1.308
(26.372) (5.636) (15.584) (21.495) (0.251)
Oil, Gas, and Coal 7 16.286 0.714 0.857 14.714 1.398
(13.376) (0.756) (0.900) (12.932) (0.296)
Chemicals etc. 9 11.111 3.778 4.778 2.556 1.361
(23.235) (5.848) (11.777) (5.897) (0.198)
Business Equipment 138 9.616 2.297 1.891 5.428 1.434
(11.708) (2.297) (4.131) (10.614) (0.320)
Telephone & Television 10 10.400 2.000 0.500 7.900 1.348
(8.897) (1.826) (0.972) (9.386) (0.154)
Utilities 2 21.000 8.500 12.500 0.000 1.122
(24.042) (7.778) (16.263) (0.000) (0.146)
Wholesale, Retail 47 17.574 1.213 6.468 9.894 1.400
(18.838) (2.021) (9.915) (17.328) (0.297)
Healthcare, Medical etc. 48 6.479 2.646 1.396 2.438 1.418
(6.823) (2.771) (3.780) (4.617) (0.270)
Other 46 11.109 2.152 3.630 5.326 1.524
(11.861) (2.521) (7.628) (10.009) (0.354)
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Table II.
Descriptive Statistics of Target Characteristics in All Auctions, Auctions Won
by Strategic versus Financial Bidders, and Across Industries
The table shows descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, and median) of target
characteristics for auctions won by dierent types of bidders and across 11 industries, as
classied by Fama and French (1997). Size is equal to book value (in $ millions); Leverage
is the ratio of book value of debt to the sum of market value of equity and book value
of debt; q-ratio is the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt
to book value of the target; Cash Flow is the sum of the last four quarterly cash ows;
and Cash is the sum of cash, short-term investments, and marketable securities. Cash
Flow, Cash, R&D, and Intangibles are normalized by target size. Standard deviations are
reported in parentheses. Medians are reported in brackets. The sample covers 01/01/2000
to 09/06/2008.
Size Leverage q-ratio Cash Flow Cash R&D Intangibles
All Auctions 654.3 0.148 1.498 0.008 0.260 0.017 0.149
(2327.4) (0.211) (1.139) (0.270) (0.242) (0.031) (0.189)
[164.4] [0.040] [1.233] [0.070] [0.194] [0.000] [0.059]
Won by Strategic Bidder 318.4 0.101 1.703 -0.029 0.324 0.025 0.146
(786.7) (0.177) (1.295) (0.329) (0.243) (0.037) (0.178)
[128.6] [0.010] [1.356] [0.058] [0.305] [0.015] [0.073]
Won by Financial Bidder 1167.8 0.220 1.184 0.064 0.161 0.005 0.154
(3517.3) (0.238) (0.749) (0.119) (0.203) (0.012) (0.206)
[258.9] [0.129] [1.000] [0.082] [0.078] [0.000] [0.047]
t-statistic of Dierence 3.383 5.324 -4.262 3.164 -6.541 -6.259 0.387
Consumer Nondurables 476.1 0.219 1.161 0.067 0.114 0.000 0.155
(821.7) (0.259) (0.579) (0.051) (0.087) (0.000) (0.207)
Consumer Durables 289.7 0.283 1.253 0.089 0.118 0.009 0.060
(238.4) (0.318) (0.476) (0.125) (0.208) (0.017) (0.070)
Manufacturing 362.5 0.190 1.219 0.105 0.085 0.004 0.105
(577.5) (0.187) (0.408) (0.075) (0.091) (0.008) (0.156)
Oil, Gas, and Coal 211.1 0.268 1.431 0.143 0.030 0.001 0.039
(189.5) (0.261) (0.639) (0.103) (0.027) (0.001) (0.103)
Chemicals etc. 1390.8 0.183 1.410 0.072 0.149 0.005 0.118
(3421.1) (0.230) (0.521) (0.097) (0.208) (0.005) (0.128)
Business Equipment 516.9 0.058 1.519 -0.050 0.399 0.032 0.183
(2812.2) (0.114) (1.005) (0.356) (0.228) (0.039) (0.193)
Telephone & Television 2021.9 0.207 1.338 0.109 0.234 0.004 0.248
(5476.8) (0.229) (0.543) (0.071) (0.187) (0.007) (0.248)
Utilities 2971.5 0.162 0.748 0.062 0.028 0.000 0.017
(2556.0) (0.229) (0.035) (0.040) (0.015) (0.000) (0.024)
Wholesale, Retail 771.8 0.222 1.082 0.068 0.080 0.000 0.084
(1501.1) (0.261) (0.613) (0.105) (0.077) (0.000) (0.130)
Healthcare, Medical etc. 417.1 0.137 2.530 -0.028 0.312 0.026 0.173
(500.6) (0.216) (1.965) (0.235) (0.260) (0.034) (0.218)
Other 959.7 0.260 1.143 0.025 0.190 0.002 0.126
(2359.3) (0.252) (0.795) (0.267) (0.229) (0.007) (0.198)
Table III.
Descriptive Statistics of Formal and Informal Bids by Strategic, Financial, and
Unknown Types of Bidders (per auction)
The table shows descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of formal and informal
bids by strategic, nancial, and unknown types of bidders per auction. The formal bid size is
in units of the target's value under the current management. The sample covers 01/01/2000 to
09/06/2008.
Total Number Per Auction Informal Bids Formal Bids Size of Formal Bid
Strategic Bidder 792 2.269 1.330 0.736 1.456
(2.910) (1.261) (0.643) (0.332)
Financial Bidder 1205 3.453 1.295 0.533 1.344
(8.236) (2.020) (0.701) (0.319)
Bidder of Unknown Type 2368 6.785 1.370 0.095 1.461
(12.574) (2.839) (0.401) (0.294)
Total 4365 12.507 3.994 1.364 1.413
(15.493) (3.255) (0.688) (0.328)
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Table IV.
Determinants of Types of Losing Bidders
The table shows the estimation results of the Logit model P(t = sjZ) used to recover the
probability of a losing bidder with unobservable type being strategic. The model is outlined in
Section II.C. In the rst specication, Z contains observable target characteristics, characteristics
of the economy, and auction outcomes. In the second specication, Z is updated with industry
xed eects following the ve-industry classication by Fama and French (1997). The sample
size (total number of losing bidders with observable type) is 1,648. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Statistical signicance is indicated by ***,**, and * for the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
levels. The sample covers 01/01/2000 to 09/06/2008.
Baseline model With industry f.e.
Const 3.932*** {
(0.751) {
log(Size) -0.075 -0.052
(0.047) (0.049)
q-ratio 0.139 0.100
(0.095) (0.104)
Leverage -1.393*** -1.337***
(0.375) (0.395)
Cash ow -1.953*** -2.351***
(0.596) (0.666)
Cash 0.197 0.134
(0.416) (0.511)
Intangibles -7.451*** -10.231***
(2.124) (2.313)
R&D -0.680** -1.065***
(0.310) (0.387)
Market Return -2.502*** -2.024**
(0.830) (0.889)
Credit Spread -29.041* -31.949*
(16.112) (17.262)
log(# bidders) -0.650*** -0.674***
(0.067) (0.075)
Won by F dummy -1.082*** -0.918***
(0.131) (0.137)
Winning bid -0.385* 0.073
(0.227) (0.251)
McFadden R2 19.37% 23.27%
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Table VI.
Average Valuations of Strategic and Financial Bidders in Dierent Subsamples
The table shows average valuations of strategic and nancial bidders (restored according
to Model II) in dierent subsamples of targets. We sort all targets in our sample based on
each characteristic, select the 10% of the sample with the lowest (highest) characteristic,
calculate average valuations of a strategic and a nancial bidder for each target in the
subsample, and report their averages over the subsample. The average valuations of
strategic and nancial bidders over the entire sample of targets are 1.167 and 1.117. The
sample covers 01/01/2000 to 09/06/2008.
Bottom Quantile of the Sample Top Quantile of the Sample
Strategic Financial Strategic Financial
log(Size) 1.291 1.201 1.047 1.073
Leverage 1.196 1.120 1.115 1.106
q-ratio 1.249 1.236 1.226 1.138
Cash Flow 1.382 1.464 1.126 1.028
Cash 1.118 1.066 1.323 1.283
R&D 1.116 1.091 1.383 1.284
Intangibles 1.205 1.153 1.122 1.049
Market Return 1.264 1.304 1.129 1.047
Credit Spread 1.112 1.072 1.261 1.254
68
T
a
b
le
V
II
.
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
R
e
su
lt
s
o
f
th
e
V
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
s
M
o
d
e
l,
M
o
d
e
ls
IV
to
V
I
(r
o
b
u
st
n
e
ss
ch
e
ck
s)
T
h
e
ta
b
le
p
ro
v
id
es
ro
b
u
st
n
es
s
ch
ec
k
s
of
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
th
e
b
as
el
in
e
m
o
d
el
(M
o
d
el
II
).
M
o
d
el
IV
re
la
x
es
A
ss
u
m
p
ti
on
2,
so
th
at
th
e
u
p
p
er
b
ou
n
d
on
va
lu
at
io
n
s
fr
om
lo
si
n
g
fo
rm
al
b
id
s
is
eq
u
al
to
10
5%
of
th
e
ta
rg
et
's
va
lu
e
u
n
d
er
th
e
cu
rr
en
t
m
an
ag
em
en
t.
M
o
d
el
V
re
la
x
es
A
ss
u
m
p
ti
on
3,
so
th
at
th
e
lo
w
er
b
ou
n
d
on
va
lu
at
io
n
s
fr
om
in
fo
rm
al
b
id
s
is
eq
u
al
to
90
%
of
th
e
ta
rg
et
's
va
lu
e
u
n
d
er
th
e
cu
rr
en
t
m
an
ag
em
en
t.
M
o
d
el
V
I
ch
ec
k
s
th
e
ro
b
u
st
n
es
s
of
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
to
th
e
p
ot
en
ti
al
p
re
se
n
ce
of
fa
t
ta
il
s
in
th
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
of
u
n
ob
se
rv
ab
le
co
m
p
on
en
t
of
va
lu
at
io
n
s
(b
y
as
su
m
in
g
th
at
th
ey
co
m
e
fr
om
a
t-
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
w
it
h

ve
d
eg
re
es
of
fr
ee
d
om
).
S
ta
ti
st
ic
al
si
gn
i
ca
n
ce
is
in
d
ic
at
ed
b
y
**
*,
**
,
an
d
*
fo
r
th
e
0.
01
,
0.
05
,
an
d
0.
10
le
ve
ls
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
ve
rs
01
/0
1/
20
00
to
09
/0
6/
20
08
.
M
o
d
el
IV
M
o
d
el
V
M
o
d
el
V
I
S
tr
at
eg
ic
F
in
an
ci
al
D
i
.
S
tr
at
eg
ic
F
in
an
ci
al
D
i
.
S
tr
at
eg
ic
F
in
an
ci
al
D
i
.
S
t.
D
ev
.
o
f
P
V
0.
25
2*
**
0.
15
9*
**
0.
09
3*
**
0.
27
2*
**
0.
16
7*
**
0.
10
5*
**
0.
24
5*
**
0.
11
2*
**
0.
13
3*
**
(0
.0
0
9)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
10
)
C
o
n
st
0
.1
28
*
0
.1
69
**
*
-0
.0
41
0.
07
3
0.
11
7*
**
-0
.0
44
0.
07
3
0.
09
7*
**
-0
.0
23
(0
.0
7
5)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
84
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
91
)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
77
)
lo
g
(S
iz
e)
-0
.0
27
**
*
0
.0
00
-0
.0
27
**
*
-0
.0
28
**
*
0.
00
1
-0
.0
29
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
0.
00
1
-0
.0
19
**
(0
.0
0
7)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
08
)
L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
47
0*
**
0.
2
04
**
*
0.
26
5
0.
49
0*
**
0.
19
7*
**
0.
29
2
0.
33
3*
*
0.
42
9*
**
-0
.0
97
(0
.1
6
5)
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.1
83
)
(0
.1
72
)
(0
.0
70
)
(0
.1
90
)
(0
.1
51
)
(0
.0
56
)
(0
.1
66
)
L
ev
er
ag
e2
-0
.5
63
**
-0
.2
21
**
-0
.3
43
-0
.5
72
**
-0
.2
13
**
-0
.3
59
-0
.3
45
-0
.6
70
**
*
0.
32
5
(0
.2
29
)
(0
.0
88
)
(0
.2
48
)
(0
.2
39
)
(0
.0
85
)
(0
.2
57
)
(0
.2
11
)
(0
.0
75
)
(0
.2
30
)
q-
ra
ti
o
-0
.0
01
0.
0
03
-0
.0
05
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
-0
.0
02
0.
00
4
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
11
)
C
as
h
F
lo
w
-0
.0
7
0*
*
-0
.3
94
**
*
0.
32
5*
**
-0
.0
68
**
-0
.3
97
**
*
0.
32
9*
**
-0
.0
81
**
-0
.3
62
**
*
0.
28
1*
**
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
53
)
C
as
h
0.
1
46
**
*
0.
0
59
0.
08
7
0.
15
7*
**
0.
06
1
0.
09
5
0.
11
2*
*
0.
08
2*
**
0.
03
0
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
4
0)
(0
.0
71
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
61
)
R
&
D
1
.6
21
**
*
-0
.0
33
1.
65
4*
*
1.
67
3*
**
-0
.0
84
1.
75
7*
**
1.
48
9*
**
0.
11
4
1.
37
5*
**
(0
.3
39
)
(0
.5
5
9)
(0
.6
70
)
(0
.3
50
)
(0
.5
43
)
(0
.6
62
)
(0
.2
87
)
(0
.4
29
)
(0
.5
31
)
In
ta
n
gi
b
le
s
0.
0
27
-0
.1
0
5*
**
0.
13
3*
*
0.
03
4
-0
.1
02
**
*
0.
13
6*
*
0.
00
7
-0
.0
92
**
*
0.
09
9*
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
2
9)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
57
)
M
ar
k
et
R
et
u
rn
-0
.0
28
-0
.2
76
**
*
0.
24
8*
-0
.0
11
-0
.2
69
**
*
0.
25
8*
0.
02
8
-0
.0
79
*
0.
10
7
(0
.1
17
)
(0
.0
5
5)
(0
.1
32
)
(0
.1
22
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.1
05
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.1
19
)
C
re
d
it
S
p
re
a
d
2.
19
2
-3
.3
27
**
*
5.
51
9*
*
2.
53
3
-2
.9
44
**
5.
47
7*
*
2.
21
3
-1
.2
74
3.
48
7
(2
.1
42
)
(0
.7
3
6)
(2
.2
88
)
(2
.2
31
)
(1
.1
47
)
(2
.5
70
)
(1
.8
85
)
(1
.0
73
)
(2
.2
68
)
Table CI.
Simulated Economy, 100x Original Sample, at Estimated Valuation Parameters
The table shows descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, and median) of the
composition of competition, as well as bounds on the outcome of takeover auctions in a
simulated economy in which bidders value targets according to Model II, Table V. Each
target in the sample is replicated 100 times; for each replication, a dierent set of bidder
valuations is simulated. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Medians are
reported in brackets.
Number Total Strategic Financial Winning LB Winning UB
All Auctions 34900 12.507 4.619 7.888 1.302 1.524
(15.471) (4.524) (12.978) (0.235) (0.316)
[6.000] [3.000] [3.000] [1.283] [1.477]
Won by Strategic Bidder 24987 11.724 5.391 6.333 1.329 1.591
(15.204) (4.655) (12.028) (0.250) (0.330)
[5.000] [4.000] [1.000] [1.313] [1.551]
Won by Financial Bidder 9913 14.481 2.675 11.806 1.235 1.355
(15.956) (3.486) (14.385) (0.176) (0.192)
[8.000] [1.000] [5.000] [1.226] [1.342]
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Table CII.
Estimation Results of the Simulated Model with Stochastic Jump Bids, Our
Model vs. Linear OLS Model vs. Button model
S and F columns correspond to true and estimated parameters (with standard errors)
of strategic and nancial bidders. t is the variance of private components; t;1 and t;2
are sensitivities of type t 2 fs; fg to the two observable target characteristics. * denotes
estimates for which the true parameter lies within 95% condence bounds.
Panel A: N 2 [2; 8], X2  N(0; 0:42).
True Incomplete model \Button" model Linear model
t S F S F S F S F
t 0.25 0.15 0.308* 0.164* 0.181 0.141* 0.106 0.103
(0.031) (0.008) (0.023) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006)
t;1 0.1 0.1 0.077* 0.112* 0.157 0.141 0.229 0.199
(0.022) (0.008) (0.020) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
t;2 0.1 0.5 0.094* 0.546* 0.152* 0.436 0.272 0.386
(0.061) (0.026) (0.050) (0.023) (0.041) (0.031)
Panel B: N 2 [2; 4], X2  N(0; 0:42).
True Incomplete model \Button" model Linear model
t S F S F S F S F
t 0.25 0.15 0.244* 0.167* 0.144 0.123 0.087 0.100
(0.029) (0.011) (0.020) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
t;1 0.1 0.1 0.129* 0.121 0.168 0.162 0.195 0.140
(0.023) (0.010) (0.017) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
t;2 0.1 0.5 0.033* 0.452* 0.036* 0.353 0.201 0.303
(0.056) (0.032) (0.053) (0.021) (0.031) (0.028)
Panel C: N 2 [2; 8], X2  N(0; 1:22).
True Incomplete model \Button" model Linear model
t S F S F S F S F
t 0.25 0.15 0.318* 0.139* 0.138 0.183 0.087 0.150*
(0.035) (0.006) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008)
t;1 0.1 0.1 0.127* 0.124 0.177 0.151 0.221 0.188
(0.023) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.028)
t;2 0.1 0.5 0.111* 0.528 0.064 0.471 0.106* 0.465*
(0.022) (0.010) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.024)
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Figure 1: Timing of the takeover auction process. This gure shows the most common timing
structure of a takeover auction process, starting from the bidder solicitation stage.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the winning slack. The gure shows the distribution of 1-Winning
Slack, which is dened as the ratio of the winning bid to the ex-post mean valuation by the winner,
conditional on the observable winning bid. Higher winning slack corresponds to lower eective
competition in an auction and to higher ability of the winner to pay more if stronger competition
arises or target characteristics change adversely.
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